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dc.contributor.authorSætra, Henrik Skaug
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-13T12:47:17Z
dc.date.available2021-10-13T12:47:17Z
dc.date.created2021-10-08T16:14:57Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationFrontiers in Robotics and AI. 2021, 8, Artikkel 744426.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2296-9144
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2799822
dc.description.abstractWhen will it make sense to consider robots candidates for moral standing? Major disagreements exist between those who find that question important and those who do not, and also between those united in their willingness to pursue the question. I narrow in on the approach to robot rights called relationalism, and ask: if we provide robots moral standing based on how humans relate to them, are we moving past human chauvinism, or are we merely putting a new dress on it? The background for the article is the clash between those who argue that robot rights are possible and those who see a fight for robot rights as ludicrous, unthinkable, or just outright harmful and disruptive for humans. The latter group are by some branded human chauvinists and anthropocentric, and they are criticized and portrayed as backward, unjust, and ignorant of history. Relationalism, in contrast, purportedly opens the door for considering robot rights and moving past anthropocentrism. However, I argue that relationalism is, quite to the contrary, a form of neo-anthropocentrism that recenters human beings and their unique ontological properties, perceptions, and values. I do so by raising three objections: 1) relationalism centers human values and perspectives, 2) it is indirectly a type of properties-based approach, and 3) edge cases reveal potentially absurd implications in practice.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFrontiersen_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectanthropocentrismen_US
dc.subjectethicsen_US
dc.subjectmoral standingen_US
dc.subjectrobotsen_US
dc.subjectrightsen_US
dc.subjectsocial robotsen_US
dc.subjectrobot rightsen_US
dc.subjectneoanthropocentrismen_US
dc.titleChallenging the Neo-Anthropocentric Relational Approach to Robot Rightsen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2021 Sætra.en_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Teknologi: 500en_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Humaniora: 000::Filosofiske fag: 160::Etikk: 164en_US
dc.source.volume8en_US
dc.source.journalFrontiers in Robotics and AIen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2021.744426
dc.identifier.cristin1944505
dc.source.articlenumber744426en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal